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Recommendations to Inspection Policy Review
of the Asian Development Bank


FoE Japan

Japan Center for Sustainable Environment and Society
Mekong Watch Japan

1. Inspection and Ombudsperson

The Inspection Function's Dual Function: Compliance and Problem Solving

As pointed out by the fist draft of the working paper, the ADB's Inspection Function has two functions, namely ensuring the compliance of the ADB's operations and solving the problems of the people affected by ADB-supported projects.

Recently, the ADB received several inspection requests from the people affected by the Samut Prakarn Wastewater Management Project (SP) in Thailand and the Southern Transport Development Project (STDP) in Sri Lanka. The Samut Prakarn Project case demonstrated the Inspection Function's failure to achieve the first objective of the policy - compliance. The latter case made it clear that the Inspection Policy was not designed to solve the problems of those affected by the ADB projects.


In the case of STDP


Affected communities did not oppose the project itself, but requested their concerns on environment impacts and public participation be addressed. They tried many ways to attract the ADB Management's attention, but received no positive answer from the ADB. Filing a claim to Inspection was the only remaining way to solve the problems.

A Dual system is needed

  The ADB's inspection mechanism needs to be strengthened, and an Ombusperson   mechanism should be established to address the concerns of project affected people.

2. Strengthening the Inspection Function

Bodies

 ◆ Board Inspection Committee

    Board Inspection Committee should be abolished.

In the course of current inspection procedure, the Board Inspection Committee (hereafter BIC) plays an important role, including recommending whether inspection should be authorized, and making final recommendations based on the Panel's report and Management's response. But BIC has been criticized on the following points;

  • BIC prepares the recommendations to the Board based on the Panel's reports. The importance and independence of the Inspection Panel as an investigation mechanism of the Board is diluted when BIC issues recommendations different from the Panel's.
  • The members of BIC have conflicting interests. BIC members sit on the Board that approves the project for inspection. Their dual role as a member of BIC which recommends to the Board and the member of the Board which considers BIC's recommendation also makes the their position complicated
  • BIC members are also working as Board members. They will not able to deal with the workload if more cases are file


In the case of Samut Prakarn Wastewater Management Project

The Panel's final report concluded that 7 policies and procedures were violated and recommended the ADB should acknowledge its failure to comply with the policies. But BIC could not reach a conclusion on 2 policy violations out of the 7. It also failed to mention anything on acknowledgement of violations in its recommendation to the Board. Thus the impacts and importance of the Panel's report was diluted.
◆ Permanent Inspection Panel

   An independent and permanent Inspection Panel should be established.


The current Inspection Function system does not have a permanent panel. Instead, when an inspection is authorized by the Board, BIC selects three panel members from the Roster of the Experts. The following concerns have been raised about this system.
  • The criteria for selecting the Panel members are unclear.
  • Institutional learning of the Panel is impossible.
  • Affected communities and civil society cannot build trust with the Panel.
  • The Panel cannot assist local people to file claims.
  • The Board does not trust the Panel
Also, BIC has practical difficulties in selecting a Panel. The candidates must be able to stop all other work for two to three months in order to serve as a Panel member.

 ◆ Secretariat

   Inspection Panel should have its own Secretariat which is independent from the Management.

BIC and the Panel do not have their own secretariat staff. The staff of the Office of the Secretary has served as a staff for BIC and the Panel. This arrangement is not only insufficient but also raised concerns regarding conflict of interests.

Process of the inspection

 ◆ Shorten and Simplify the Process

   Inspection process should not be lengthy or complicated. The Complaint to the Management is unnecessary.

The inspection process is lengthy. It takes at least 110 days from the first complaint letter for the Board to approve an inspection. Requesters have to send the complain letter to the President before they file a claim to BIC. This process should be eliminated because in many cases local people have tried to contact the Management before filing a claim.

 ◆ Informal Advice on eligibility requirement

   The Panel should provide informal advice to requesters so that requesters can easily fulfill the eligibility requirements.

Currently, no support is provided to the requesters. Requesters have to obtain, read and understand all relevant policies, and write a request for inspection in English. This is a huge burden to the requesters. Also, BIC has not provided any support for requesters to meet the eligibility requirements.

In the case of STDP

In Management's response to the first claim, Management claimed that there was no evidence to show the requesters were affected people or their representatives. This requirement could have easily been met if there were support from BIC.
◆ Initial Investigation

  If a request for inspection is not clearly ineligible, the Panel should conduct an initial investigation including a site visit.


Under current procedures, the recommendation on whether to authorize the inspection is based only on the request and Management's response. If the request is not clearly ineligible, the Panel should conduct an initial investigation.

 ◆ Decision on inspection

  When the Panel considers not to authorize the inspection, the Panel should send the draft report and recommendations to the requester and the requester will be provided certain number of days to comment on the draft.


Not to authorize the inspection without requester's opinion will pose the questions on impartiality of the recommendation. This process will substitute current consultation process with the member of the Roaster.
In the case of STDP

BIC's recommendation not to authorize the inspection was made without hearing the requester's opinion, thus the legitimacy of the recommendation was questioned.
◆ Inspection Panel's Report

   A draft of Inspection Panel report should be sent to the requester and the requester should be provided certain number of days to comment on the draft. The Inspection Panel report should contain remedies for the project as well as relevant facts and the Panel's conclusion on the Management's compliance. The report should be made public immediately after it is sent to the Board, Management and requester.

 ◆ Management's Response

   Management's response to the Inspection Panel report should be limited to an implementation plan based on the remedies recommended by the Panel.

In the case of Samut Prakarn Wastewater Management Project

Management's response denied every policy violation and conclusion on material harm, and attacked the Panel. It damaged the ADB's credibility, and undermined the Panel's importance as a investigation mechanism of the Board.

◆ Requester's Participation in the Process

  In the inspection process, requesters should be provided with sufficient information and opportunities to express their opinions.

  • When the Panel is considering not to authorize the inspection , requesters should be informed before the decision and given ^opportunities for comment.
  • During the inspection process, requesters should be given monthly updates on the progress of the inspection.
  • The Inspection Panel will send the draft final report to requesters and requesters will have opportunities for comment.
  • The Panel's report will be sent to requesters at the same time as to the Board and the Management.
  • Management's response will be sent to requesters at the same time as to the Board.
  • The Board decision will be sent to the requesters with information on a monitoring mechanism.

Once the inspection process begins, requesters have difficulties participating in the process. The only opportunity where requesters can express their opinions is during the Panel's site visit. After that, requesters have to wait for the final decision of the Board.
Management has an access to the Board members while requesters do not have a chance to contact them. This imbalanced access to the Board also should be addressed.

In the case of Samut Prakarn Wastewater Management Project

Because of the conditions imposed by the Thai Government, the Panel could not visit the site and interview the requesters. The Panel produced the interim report and asked BIC to send the report to requesters for comments, but this proposal was ignored by BIC. After that, there was no opportunity for requesters to express their opinions. On the other hand, the Management was provided 60 days to respond to the Panel's report.

3. Establishment of Ombudsperson mechanism

   
An Ombusperson mechanism should be established. The mechanism will address the concerns of project-affected people. The process should be flexible and easy-to-use. Due consideration should be paid to the accountability of the Ombudsperson mechanism.

4. Relation between Inspection Function and Ombudsperson Mechanism

   The Inspection Panel and Ombudsperson mechanism will work independently, and requesters should be able to choose which mechanism they want to file their claim. Requesters in the ombudsperson process may file a claim to Inspection Panel if their concerns cannot be adequately addressed by the Ombudsperson mechanism. Requesters whose claim is under inspection review, however, cannot file a claim to the Ombudsperson mechanism.

This will ensure that requesters will not be pressured by the ADB to transfer their request to be more compromising ombudsperson mechanism.

5. Scope of the mechanism

95% Rule
  The 95% rule should be abolished.

The Inspection Policy exclude from the scope of inspection policy projects for which 95% or more of ADB's financing has been disbursed. But the ADB still has certain (but smaller) leverage on the project, so there is no need to exclude these projects from the inspection. Also, this rule may be an incentive for the ADB staff to rush disbursement to avoid the inspection when local people raise concerns.

6. Assistance to the requesters

Providing Information on Inspection and Ombudsperson Mechanisms

   Project affected communities should be informed of the inspection and ombudsperson policies in local languages. They also should be provided important policies and procedures in local languages.

Currently, inspection policy or other relevant policies and project-related documents are only provided in English. Local people should have access to these documents in local languages.

Language

   Requests for inspection/ombudsperson in local languages should be allowed. Necessary translation support should be provided.

Current policy requires the claim to be filed in English. The World Bank allows the request in local languages.

Protecting the requesters

   The Loan Agreement and other policies should include clauses to avoid backlashes against requesters. Requesters should be able to file a request anonymously.

There are some cases where World Bank Inspection Panel requesters in India or Bangladesh have faced severe reprisals.

7. Independence of Investigations

Indepedence of the Panel and Ombudsperson

   The Panel and Ombudsperson should be independent from the Management. Requirements for the members of the Panel and Ombudsperson mechanism should be similar to current requirements to be a member of the Roster.

Ensuring Field Visit
   
   
Policies should be revised to ensure the Panel and the Ombudsperson can visit the project site.

Current policy require BIC to obtain 'no objection' from the Director representing the relevant country to the Panel's field visit. This requirement makes it difficult for the Panel to collect important information.

In the case of Samut Prakarn Wastewater Management Project

Originally the Panel scheduled a visit to Thailand in September 2001, but the Thai government imposed many conditions for the site visit. The BIC chairman visited Thailand to persuade the Thai government but the Thai government still maintained its position. The Panel finally gave up visiting Thailand and suspended activities. As a result, the Panel had to write its final report without enough information.
Communication

   The Panel and Ombudsperson should have ways to communicate with stakeholders inside and outside the ADB independently. It should have its own budget, website, and issue its own news releases.
In the case of Samut Prakarn Wastewater Management Project

The Panel was forced to communicate with stakeholders through BIC. It restricted the Panel's independence, and disrupted the Panel's ability to get adequate information from local people and international civil society.
8. Accountability of Inspection Panel and Ombudsperson

Disclosure of the Reasons to be ineligible

   If the Panel or the Ombudsperson decides the request to be ineligible, the conclusion and the reasons should be sent to the requester and be made public immediately after the decision.

Under current procedures, when BIC finds the request ineligible, no reason is made public. It is not clear why BIC finds the requests to be ineligible. To ensure the transparency of the process, the decision and the reasons should be disclosed.

Accountability of the Inspection

   Every Panel's decision should be disclosed, including notification of the receipt, initial investigation, final report and monitoring report.

9. Monitoring of the Board Decision

Need for Monitoring Mechanism

   It is necessary to monitor the implementation of the Board approved remedies. Management should report periodically to the Board and the Inspection Panel/Ombudsperson regarding the progress of implementation of the Board approved remedies.

Claim on Implementation of the Remedies

   When requesters find Management failed to implement the Board approved remedies, requesters can file a claim to the Panel or Ombudsperson. The Panel or Ombudsperson will conduct necessary investigation including field visits, and recommend measures for improvement to the Board.

10. Monitoring Compliance

   The Panel and Ombudsperson will have a joint committee to share experiences and to reflect on the effectiveness of ADB policies including the inspection/ombudsperson policies. The joint committee will conduct necessary investigation of ADB policies and make recommendation to the Board. The conclusions and the recommendations will be disclosed.

11. Private Sector Operations

PSO and compliance

   Both Inspection and Ombudsperson policies should be applied to Private Sector Operations.

Under current inspection policy, private sector operations (PSO) are not within its scope. PSO should follow ADB policies and procedures, and should thus be within the scope of the inspection or ombudsperson mandates.

Claims from Business Competitors

   Claims from Business Competitors can be considered in the eligibility requirement.

Safeguard Policies for Private Sector Operations
   
   The application of the policies including safeguard policies should be clarified.

In the Operations Manual, it is not clear which part of the policies and procedures are applied to PSO. It should be clarified.

Information Disclosure of Private Sector Operations

   Policies on Information Disclosure of Private Sector Operations should be revised.

In private sector operations, detailed information on projects should be disclosed. Project Profiles (PP) and Report and Recommendation of the President (RRP) of PSO must be disclosed to facilitate problem solving at earlier stages of project cycles. Otherwise, potentially affected people have no way of collecting information needed to file inspection claims. If any information must be withheld, the PP and RRP should provide all other information, together with the reasons for withholding the undisclosed information.

12. Suspension of Disbursement

   The Inspection Panel and Ombudsperson should be able to recommend that the Board suspend the disbursement, cancel loans, or suggest borrowers to suspend implementation of projects after the Panel decides to authorize an inspection.

Current policies do not specify any action to be taken before the Board's consideration of BIC's reports. As a result, the project continues while inspections are on-going. In several cases, some actions are needed.
Suspension of the loan disbursement or cancellation of the loan is important leverage the ADB has on each project. The continuation of the loan disbursement may lead to extra cost for the borrower and the ADB.

In the case of Samut Prakarn Wastewater Management Project

Local people continuously requested that the loan disbursement be suspended, but the ADB continued the disbursement. As a result, 90% of the project was completed when the Board approved BIC's recommendation, and thus undermined the importance of the recommendation.
13. Inspection and Loan Agreement

Standard loan agreements should be revised in relation with the inspection policy. The following points should be considered.
  • Compliance with loan covenants
  • Ensuring the Inspection Panel and Ombudsperson's right to visit project sites.
  • Suspension of loan disbursements and cancellation of loans as a result of the ADB's violation of its policies.
Loan agreements are critical documents defining ADB's rights and obligations in project implementation. But standard loan agreements do not have clauses to ensure the implementation of the inspection policy. The Inspection Panel's right to investigation, ADB's rights to suspend disbursements and cancel loans should be included in the loan agreements.
Also, loan agreements should be made public for public scrutiny.
This paper was jointly prepared for submission at the ADB's Tokyo Consultations to Review the Inspection Function, June 11, 2002. For questions or comments, please contact FUKUDA Kenji of Mekong Watch Japan (03-3832-5034 or fukudan@sol.dti.ne.jp).

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