I. GRSC: concerns and its status

Findings raise serious doubts regarding the effectiveness of the GRSC. First, current status of the GRSC process and the power and gender imbalance in its composition should be noted. The commencement of GRSC's operation has been delayed for nearly 2 months due the fact that 2 of its members have not yet been selected. Furthermore, the only meeting held so far was attended by only two member of the GRSC. Information dissemination to local communities is clearly insufficient and inadequate; none of the villagers I have met were informed of the GRSC. In addition, the fact that necessary information has not been provided to the ADB Management by the Government of Pakistan (GoP) suggests inadequacy of coordination between the ADB staff and GoP.

All of the members of the GRSC selected so far, including the Representatives of People affected, are male, powerful, and affluent figures of the society. It is important to note that the selection procedures for the Representative of People Affected were ignored, and an appointment was made on the discretion of the local official. According to the Requester, both representatives are prominent landlords and are known for their alliances with the governmental officials. In fact, one of the representatives has been the opponent of the affectees' campaign.

Secondly, the confidence of local communities in the GRSC, which is the prerequisite for any satisfactory resolution to the disputes, is completely absent. When we provided the villagers with the list of the GRSC members and selection procedures of the Representatives of People Affected, all villagers expressed strong distrust in the members of the GRSC. In fact, some villagers have displayed outright hostility against WAPDA and governmental officials based on their past experiences and disappointments. Moreover, all of the villagers rejected the legitimacy of the selection procedures for the Representatives of People Affected, and accurately speculated that the representatives appointed by the Government would be affluent allies of the government. In addition, they noted that two people could not possibly represent the various and vast concerns of the communities. Villagers were in unanimous agreement that the outcome of the GRSC will not be positive or meaningful without a greater presence of marginalized affectees in the GRSC, and that only direct representation by the affectees was appropriate and legitimate.

In contrast, staff of the ADB Resident Missions believed that the GRSC is legitimate and adequate despite the above concerns I have delivered to them. They did not seem to understand the concerns of the Requesters and local communities, and it is highly questionable if they have even read the relevant documents, such as: Second Supplement to the Inspection Claim, and Roster member's comment on the Recommendations of the Board Inspection Committee. Furthermore, the staff blamed the local NGOs for their disengagement in the GRSC; however, it should be noted that no response has been made by the ADB to the Requester's demand in the Second Supplement that the GRSC, which states:
The Requesters would like to present the following demands in the context of any insistence for negotiation and dialogue in the future…The GRSC should be redesigned in the light of the principles and guidelines provided by the World Commission on Dams Final Report. Most importantly, the project affectees should have fifty percent of the membership in the GRSC through direct nomination of their legitimate representative forums…
Under such circumstances, the gap between the GRSC and the local communities is not expected to be filled.

Moreover, I have heard complaints from every villager regarding the corruption of the governmental officials in delivery of compensations or remedies. It should be noted that monitoring procedures of the GRSC told by the staff at the Resident mission, as well as the ADB's current anti-corruption measures, are inappropriate, and the recommendations of the GRSC are not even legally binding.

II. Design failures of the CRBIP, subsequent damages,
and other environmental and social impacts of CRBIP

It should be highlighted that the fundamental design flaws seem to stem from careless disturbances with the natural hydrology-failure to manage two different water flows, the hill torrent from West to East, and main canal from North to South. Combining several natural flood streams per Flood Carrier Channel (FCC) has strengthened the destructive force of the hill torrent, while the ill-designed cross-drainage structures do not allow floodwater to cross the main canal, resulting in extensive flooding in the area before the structures.

It should be noted that the study conducted by Japan International Cooperation Association (JICA) for the same hill torrents are different from the feasibility study of the CRBIP regarding the figures of maximum discharges of floodwater, etc. Furthermore, conclusion of JICA's study recommends not to engineer intervention of flood hydrology or disturb the watercourses.

According to the Requester, if local traditional knowledge has been consulted and incorporated into the project, such as use of existing natural floodwater channels and incorporation of traditional hill torrent irrigation, obvious design flaws and subsequent damages would have been prevented, and the amount of land acquisition and project costs reduced. Instead, the ADB documents suggest that the project design was based mainly on economic and budgetary concerns, and without proper consultations of the local communities or adequate environmental assessment.

Furthermore, some obvious and grave design failures seem to be caused by a simple lack of integrity or extreme carelessness. Based on the interview with the Acting Chief Engineer of WAPDA, it could be concluded that the shifting of Indus River to the east since the 70's, has not been considered in the project design. Therefore, the FCCs and distribution canals (distributaries) do not reach their ultimate drainage point, Indus River; instead, they terminate at the riverine belt, which was the active bed of the Indus River when the feasibility study was initially prepared in the 70's. As an obvious consequence, the riverine belt has been extensively flooded. It is difficult to imagine how such unequivocal and fundamental design flaw based on the obsolete feasibility study and topography passed the ADB's approval in 1991, and has been ignored for more than a decade. The same is true for the insufficient number of bridges over FCCs, inadequacy and erosion of embankments, and distributaries that are too deep to channel water to minor distributaries.

I have witnessed the extremely costly social and environmental consequences of such budgetary restrictions and alleged policy violation of the ADB. They include: extensive flooding of the west side of the main canal and riverine belt; destruction of villages and agricultural land, and production of water-borne diseases due to flooding and breaching of the distributaries; inevitable impoverishment of people due to the lack of appropriate compensation and a resettlement plan; risk of life caused by flooding and conflicts between ethnic groups; water logging; restriction on villagers' mobility and access to facilities; widened disparity between rich and poor; and environmental destruction, such as deforestation, land erosion, etc. Such situation especially disadvantages women and marginalizes groups.　

III. CRBIP-III induced vulnerabilities
and some demands of the local communities

Of the 7 villages I visited, I observed the urgency of the vast and various project-induced vulnerabilities that the local communities face and substantial burden imposed on the communities that are already deprived of resources. For example the village of Sokkar, population of 10,000, located on the west side of the main canal, faces the danger of drowning in floodwater in the flood protection embankment surrounding the village. In fact, the embankment was almost breached by the three flood streams that meet near the village last year. Affectees of Morjhangi Village at the riverine belt mourned that the entire village would submerge in free-flowing canal water if the distributary is operated for few more days. A villager of Lashari commented that they have became poorer due to recurrent damage to crops. Women of the Kandi Walla village are now forced to travel 5 to 6 km to obtain drinking water due to failure of the drinking water scheme of the CRBIP.

It is important to note that their experiences and demands are different depending on each situation of the communities. Furthermore, accurate or exact figures of the damages are not available regarding the extent of the land acquired for the project, damages, etc. Such circumstances illustrate the need for independent and comprehensive investigation in full consultation with the communities in order to understand the extent and nature of the project-induced vulnerabilities, and to explore the possible solutions that are effective and suitable for each community. Moreover, it is crucial to remember that although most of the affectees demand land for land, there is no resettlement plan. Mr. Gadi believes that the resettlement guidelines and land acquisition guidelines required for the National Drainage Programme (NDP) are applicable in the CRBIP because of supplementary financing through directing NDP loan proceeds to the CRBIP .